

less'. Their continuing confusion is marked not only in the doubt of their *δυομαθῆ δ' ὄμωσ*, but also in the way in which they apparently relate Cassandra's knowledge of Greek specifically and only to her *speaking* Greek (and yet their inability to understand her). They do not seem to realise the full implication of her previous remark; once more, there is a failure of communication in this dialogue. But even their denial of knowledge may be seen as ironically and uncannily *cledomantic*. For the strange adjective *πυθόκραντα* 'Delphi-ordained' is, as well as *δυομαθῆ*, all too applicable to Cassandra's oracles, which stem precisely from her Apollo-ordained frenzy—and after that remark from the chorus, Cassandra indeed immediately turns again to a passage of prophetic fervour and an appeal (1257) to her mastering god. The hard-to-understand ordinances from Delphi are immediately evinced. This dialogue, then, a network of 'méconnaissances' and gaps in the exchange of language, once more brings to attention the role of communication as such in the *Oresteia*.

A final point: *καὶ μὲν* at the beginning of 1254 is not, then, to be regarded simply as 'adversative', but *also* as 'progressive'; *both* 'adversative' in that her understanding Greek is apparently no help to the chorus' understanding her, and 'progressive' in that her understanding Greek all too well leads to the ironic recognition of an unexpected truth in the chorus' language. Cassandra's metaphorical, sliding language of truth cannot be controlled by the imposition of such rigid distinctions and delimitations in the functioning of such an ambiguous connective—as for example Fraenkel here requires. In the slippage of the text, the attempt to control such ambiguity (an attempt which often calls itself 'objective', 'decisive', 'critical') is seen as arbitrary closure. Cassandra's language of truth, her access to the complexities of events and the language to express them, stands against the commentators' search for the univocal, literal, simple. The exchange between Cassandra and the chorus is not to be simply, 'objectively' controlled. For what the prophetess knows and expresses all too well is the excess in language.

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### Rhea in Callimachus' *Hymn to Zeus*

ἐν δέ σε Παρρασίη 'Ρεῖη τέκεν, ἤχι μάλιστα 10  
ἔσκεν ὄρος θάμνοισι περισκεπές· ἔνθεν ὁ χῶρος  
ἱερός, οὐδέ τί μιν κεχηρημένον Εἰλειθυίης  
ἔρπετον οὐδὲ γυνή ἐπιμίσγεται, ἀλλὰ ἐ 'Ρεῖης  
ὠγγύγιον καλέουσι λεχώιον Ἀπιδανῆς.  
ἔνθα σ' ἐπεὶ μήτηρ μεγάλων ἀπεθήκατο κόλπων 15  
αὐτίκα δίζητο ῥόον ὕδατος, ᾧ κε τόκοιο  
λύματα χυτλώσαιτο, τεὸν δ' ἐνὶ χρώτα λοέσσαι.  
Λάδων ἀλλ' οὐπω μέγας ἔρρεεν οὐδ' Ἐρύμανθος . . .

Von Jan first drew attention to the etymological play in 14, an allusion to the derivation of Ἀπιδανῆς from ἀ-πίειν:<sup>1</sup> at the birth of Zeus Arcadia was yet

<sup>1</sup> F. von Jan (de Ian), *De Callimacho Homeri interprete* (diss. Strasburg 1893) 80 n. 1, *d. Eustath. ad Dion. Perieg.* 414 (*Geog. Gr. min.*, ed. Müller ii 293).

waterless, as we learn from 18 ff. The play gains added point from 40 f., where the Peloponnesians thirst no longer: *παλαιότατον δέ μιν* (Neda) *ὑδωρ/υῖωνοι πίνουσι Λυκαονίης ἄρκοιο*.<sup>2</sup>

This is not all. Most ancient etymologists derived 'Ρέα by metathesis from ἔρα, 'ground';<sup>3</sup> but another tradition, at least as old as Plato, connected the word with *ρεῖν*. Thus Pl. *Crat.* 402b–c, *τί οὖν; δοκεῖ σοι ἀλλοιότερον Ἡράκλειτον νοεῖν ὁ τιθέμενος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν προγόνοις 'Ρεῖαν τε καὶ Κρόνον* [i.e. *Κροῖνον*]; ἄρα οἶε ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἀμφοτέροις *ρευμαίων ὀνόματα θέσθαι*; *Ei. Mag.* 701.24, *'Ρεῖα ἐπὶ τῆς θεοῦ Πλάτων μὲν, παρὰ τὸ ρεῖν καὶ μὴ μένειν τὸν χρόνον· οἱ δέ, ἐπειδὴ κόλποισιν ἀφράστοις/δεξαμένης Διὸς ὄμβροι καταρέουσι. Κρόνω δὲ λέγουσιν αὐτὴν συνεῖναι, καθόσον ἐξ αἰδίου χρόνου ἢ τοιαύτη ῥύσις γίνεται. Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ φασιν αὐτὴν εἶναι ῥύσιν καὶ φορὰν τῶν γινομένων πραγμάτων. Χρῦσιππος δὲ λέγει (fr. 1084, SVF ii 318) τὴν γῆν 'Ρεῖαν κεκλήσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ρεῖ τὰ ὕδατα. Cf. Σ Hes. Th. 135 p. 31 di Gregorio, 'Ρεῖα κατὰ τὸν Χρῦσιππον (fr. 1085) ἢ ἐξ ὄμβρων χύσις· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ γῆ; Corn. 3, 4, 6; Σ A.R. i 1098 p. 97 Wendel. In poetry the link is made explicit at fr. *Orph.* 132 Kern = *Or. Chald.* 56 des Places, *'Ρεῖη τοι νοερῶν μακάρων πηγῆ τε ῥοῆ τε / πάντων γὰρ πρώτη δυνάμεις κόλποισιν ἀφράστοις / δεξαμένη γενεὴν ἐπὶ πᾶν προχέει τροχάουσαν*. Callimachus has this etymology in mind at 15 ff. When Rhea gave birth to Zeus and 'dropped him from her great lap', we are reminded of the *Κόλπος 'Ρέας*, the northern Adriatic;<sup>4</sup> yet the goddess whose name suggests flowing water cannot find even a spring in which to wash her infant: *ῥόον ὕδατος* (16), *ἔρρεεν* (18) and *'Ρεῖη* (21) point the paradox.*

The case for conscious etymologizing is strengthened by *Or. Sib.* iii 135 ff., where overt explication of *Δία* is followed immediately by juxtaposition of *'Ρεῖη* and *ῥεῖν*:<sup>5</sup>

ἀλλ' ὅτε τῇ τριτάτῃ γενεῇ τέκε πότνια 'Ρεῖη 135  
τίχθ' Ἡρην πρώτην· καὶ ἐπεὶ ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν  
θῆλυ γένος, ᾧχοντο πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἄγριοι ἄνδρες  
Τιτῆνες καὶ ἔπειτα 'Ρεῖη τέκεν ἄρσενα παῖδα,  
τὸν ταχέως διέπεμψε λάθρῃ ἰδίῃ τε τρέφεσθαι  
ἐς Φρυγίην, τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἐνόρκους Κρήτας ἐλοῦσα·  
τοῦνεκα τὸν Δί' ἐπωνομάσανθ' ὅτι διέπεμφθη,  
τὸ τρίτον αὖ Πλούτωνα 'Ρεῖη τέκε δία γυναικῶν,  
Δωδώνην παριοῦσα, ὅθεν ῥεῖν ὕγρὰ κέλευθα  
Εὐρώπου ποταμοῖο . . .

According to the more popular derivation, *'Ρεῖα* = *ἔρα* = *γαῖα* = *Γαῖα*: the two goddesses are often identified.<sup>6</sup> In Call. *H.* 1 a flowing of water (*ἐκ δ' ἔχεεν*

<sup>2</sup> In itself the drinking = inhabiting expression is of course a *topos*: cf. E. Norden, *Sitz. d. kön. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.* 1917, 673–4, *cl.* (in addition to the examples given by G. L. McLennan, *Callimachus. Hymn to Zeus* [Rome 1977] *ad loc.*) Crinag. *AP* ix 291.2 = *Garland of Philip* 1924 Gow–Page, *id.*, *AP* ix 430.1–2 = 1987–98 Gow–Page, *id.*, *AP* 61.5–6 = 1933–4 Gow–Page, *Nemes. Cyn.* 67–8.

<sup>3</sup> For a full collection of evidence see O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* (Munich 1906) 1524 n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Thus McLennan: cf. A. *PV* 837 *κέλευθον ἤξας πρὸς μέγαν κόλπον 'Ρέας* (n.b. *μέγαν* ~ *μεγάλων κόλπων*, 15), *Σ ad loc.* *ὅτι 'Ρέας Κόλπος ὁ Ἰόνιος πρῶν ἔκαλεῖτο*.

<sup>5</sup> I find no comment by V. Nikiprowetzky, *La troisième Sibylle, Études juives* ix (Paris/La Haye 1970).

<sup>6</sup> See E. Cahen, *Les hymnes de Callimaque* (Paris 1930) 23.

μέγα χεῦμα, 32) from the earth (Γαῖα, 29) reconciles the two alternatives of *ρεῖν* and *ἔρα*.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> McLennan makes the interesting suggestion that we should see in *ἐλαφραῖ* an allusion to adverbial *ρεῖα*, with implicit contrast of Rhea and Gaia.

I am indebted to Dr F. J. Williams for useful criticism.

### Νημερτής τ' ἑρόεσσα μελάγκουρος τ' Ἀσάφεια

In *fr.* 122B and 123B (DK) Empedocles mentions a series of opposite personifications, e.g. Beauty and Ugliness (122.3), Movement and Rest (123.2); the last pair mentioned in *fr.* 122 is *Nemertes-Asapheia*.

*Nemertes* is known to us from Hom. *Il.* xviii 46, and Hes. *Th.* 262; on both occasions she appears in a catalogue of Nereids. Hesiod emphatically says that she has her father's character, about which he has told us already: *Th.* 233, *Νηρέα δ' ἀψευδέα καὶ ἀληθέα<sup>1</sup> γείνατο Πόντος*. Nereus' name, furthermore, is explained by the adjectives *νημερτής* and *ἤπιος* (235).

The original meaning of *νημερτής*, 'unerring', develops easily into 'true'<sup>2</sup>—cf. Hom. *Il.* vi 376, where Hector says: *εἰ δ' ἄγε μοι, δμωαί, νημερτέα μυθήσασθε!*, and the reply in 382: *ἀνωγας ἀληθέα μυθήσασθαι*. The meaning of *νημερτέα* here is clearly 'true'. The same meaning can be distilled from the fact that *ψεύδος* is the opposite of *νημερτής*—cf. *Od.* iii 327–8: *... ἵνα νημερτές ἐνίσπη / ψεύδος δ' οὐκ ἔρέει*. These words remind us of the catalogue of the Nereids in the *Iliad* mentioned above, where the meaning of the name *Nemertes* seems to be strengthened by the immediately following name *Apseudes*: for such litotes-like combinations cf., e.g., Critias, *fr.* 1.4, where Anacreon is said to be *ἡδὺν ἄλυπον*.

So the meaning of the name *Nemertes* is 'Truth', *pace* van der Ben, who renders the name 'Unfallible';<sup>3</sup> the meaning 'Truth' is also given by Guthrie,<sup>4</sup> Wright,<sup>5</sup> and DK.

The name *Asapheia* is a neologism derived from (ἀ)σαφής analogous to *ἀληθής-ἀλήθεια*; van der Ben 162 gives some other parallels: *Λιμνώρεια*, *Ἀμάθεια*, *Ἥριγένεια* and *Ἀτρέκεια*. Empedocles had other personifications at his disposal to express the opposite of Truth—e.g. *Pseudos* (Hes. *Th.* 229); *Apate* (*ibid.* 224);<sup>6</sup> *Lethe*.<sup>7</sup> So Empedocles coined the name *Asapheia* probably *metri causa*.

<sup>1</sup> H. Boeder, 'Der frühgriechische Wortgebrauch von Logos und Aletheia', *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* iv (1959) 91, observes that *ἀλήθεια* and *ἀληθής* are never used as predicate or attribute with the exception of Hes. *Th.* 233.

<sup>2</sup> Boeder (n. 1) 91 remarks that the pre-Homeric *ἔτεόν* ('true') is replaced by *σαφής*, *νημερτής* and esp. *ἀληθής*; cf. *ibid.* 98.

<sup>3</sup> N. van der Ben, *The Proem of Empedocles' Peri Physios* (Amsterdam 1975) 107.

<sup>4</sup> W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* ii (Cambridge 1965) 255.

<sup>5</sup> M. R. Wright, *Empedocles: the extant fragments* (New Haven/London 1981) 280.

<sup>6</sup> For the implications of this word see M. L. West, *Hesiod, Theogony* (Oxford 1966) *ad loc.*

<sup>7</sup> For *Lethe* and its negative *ἀληθής* see West (n. 6) 230–1, 233, Boeder (n. 1) 92–4.

The basic idea inherent in *ἀσάφεια* is that of the negative of *σαφής*, 'clear, distinct';<sup>8</sup> but in view of the fact that *Ἀσάφεια* is a neologism it seems legitimate to take into account the fact that 'lie, untruth' is a regular opposite of *νημερτής*. A close relationship between the concepts of 'clearness' and 'truth' is suggested for example by comparison of Parmenides *fr.* 1B.29–30, where *Ἀληθείης ἦτορ* is opposed to *βροτῶν δόξας*, and Xenophanes *fr.* 34B.1–4, where *τὸ μὲν σαφές* (1) is the opposite of *δόκος δ'* (4)—so it seems that the meaning of *ἀλήθεια* and *τὸ σαφές*<sup>9</sup> is very similar. The same is suggested in Page's note *ad Eur. Med.* 72: *μῦθος εἰ σαφής ὁδε κτλ.*, 'the story which is clear . . . is the true story'.<sup>10</sup> One might argue that clarity is still at the centre of the meaning there, but there is certainly no broad distinction of meaning, if any, between Penelope's words to Telemachus (*οὐκ ἔτλης*) *νόστον σοῦ πατρὸς σάφα εἶπμεν*, and Telemachus' reply: *τοιγὰρ ἐγὼ τοι, μῆτερ, ἀληθείην καταλέξω* (*Od.* xvii 106–8); finally, there seems to be no doubt possible in *Il.* iv 404: *μὴ ψεύδε', ἐπιστάμενος σάφα εἶπεῖν*, where Leaf prefers the meaning 'truly', referring to Soph. *El.* 1223, *Trach.* 387, and Eur. *Med.* 72.

So, in view of the fact that there is no parallel to support a distinct meaning for the neologism *ἀσάφεια*, and because the idea naturally and not infrequently opposed to *νημερτής* is 'Untruth', I accept the meaning 'Untruth' in the present passage—*pace* DK 'Verworrenheit', Guthrie 'Obscurity', van der Ben 'Uncertain', Wright 'Uncertainty' and Lloyd 'Obscurity'.<sup>11</sup>

The meaning of *μελάγκουρος* is disputed: some connect the element *-κουρος* with *κείρω*, e.g. LSJ 'black-haired' (so Guthrie). But Wright 281 observes correctly: 'the color of the hair is irrelevant'. On the same grounds we can reject Wilamowitz' 'mit schwarzem Haarschur'.<sup>12</sup> The derivation from *κούρη*, 'pupil', seems preferable—cf. van der Ben 162. DK had already translated 'schwarzaugeig', but, again, I can see nothing relevant in the dark colour of the pupils(!) or of the eyes: the pupil of the eye tends to be black, while dark eyes can be very beautiful and are in consequence an inept opposite of the preceding *ἑρόεσσα*, the qualification of *Νημερτής*.

It is therefore with good reason that van der Ben tries to expand the meaning 'with dark pupils', but his 'blind' seems too subtle: "with dark pupils then means with pupils without light or vision", "blind"—the meaning accepted by Wright 281–2. Van der Ben bases this interpretation primarily on Soph. *Aj.* 955, *κελαινώπαν θυμόν*—but the adj. *κελαινώπησις* does not imply blindness of the soul: cf. Stanford *ad loc.*, 'Jebb may be right in giving the ending full value as "faced" here so as to suggest "the dark soul which watches from its place of concealment with malevolent joy"'.<sup>13</sup> So

<sup>8</sup> Boeder (n. 1) 93 argues that 'the *λήθων* prevents his knowledge from being shared with someone else'—which could be qualified as *ἀφανές* or *ἄδηλον*: but the former word is not found in epic at all, while the latter is found once meaning 'invisible' (Hes. *Erga* 6).

<sup>9</sup> For *τὸ σαφές* ('Klarheit und Zuverlässigkeit die auf Augenzeugenschaft beruht') see H. Fraenkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (München 1962) 382–3, esp. n. 20; also *id.*, *Frühgriechisches Denken* (München 1960) 342–9.

<sup>10</sup> D. L. Page, *Euripides Medea*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1952).

<sup>11</sup> G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* (Cambridge 1966) 63 n. 1.

<sup>12</sup> U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Sitz. d. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss. Berlin* 1929, 639 f.

<sup>13</sup> W. B. Stanford, *Sophocles Ajax* (London 1963).